A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION by John Locke.
Extracts.
I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristic mark of
the true Church.
...if he be destitute of charity, meekness, and good-will in
general towards all mankind, even to those that are not
Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true Christian
himself.
Whosoever will list himself under the banner of Christ, must, in
the first place and above all things, make war upon his own
lusts and vices.
...no man can be a Christian without charity and without that
faith which works, not by force, but by love.
If anyone maintain that men ought to be compelled by fire and
sword to profess certain doctrines, and conform to this or that
exterior worship, without any regard had unto their morals; if
anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto the
faith, by forcing them to profess things that they do not
believe and allowing them to practise things that the Gospel
does not permit, it cannot be doubted indeed but such a one is
desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same
profession with himself; but that he principally intends by
those means to compose a truly Christian Church is altogether
incredible.
If, like the Captain of our salvation, they sincerely desired
the good of souls, they would tread in the steps and follow the
perfect example of that Prince of Peace, who sent out His
soldiers to the subduing of nations, and gathering them into His
Church, not armed with the sword, or other instruments of force,
but prepared with the Gospel of peace and with the exemplary
holiness of their conversation.
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly
the business of civil government from that of religion and to
settle the just bounds that lie between the one and
the other.
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial
execution of equal laws, to secure unto all the people in
general and to every one of his subjects in particular the just
possession of these things belonging to this life. If anyone
presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity,
established for the preservation of those things, his
presumption is to be checked by the fear of punishment,
consisting of the deprivation or diminution of those civil
interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and ought to
enjoy.
...it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to
one man over another as to compel anyone to his religion.
All the life and power of true religion consist in the inward
and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without
believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward
worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own
mind that the one is true and the other well pleasing unto God,
such profession and such practice, far from being any
furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation.
And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be
compelled to the belief of anything by outward force.
...it is one thing to persuade, another to command; one thing to
press with arguments, another with penalties.
Every man has commission to admonish, exhort, convince another
of error, and, by reasoning, to draw him into truth; but to give
laws, receive obedience, and compel with the sword, belongs to
none but the magistrate. And, upon this ground, I affirm that
the magistrate's power extends not to the establishing of any
articles of faith, or forms of worship, by the force of his
laws. For laws are of no force at all without penalties, and
penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent, because they
are not proper to convince the mind. Neither the profession of
any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of
worship (as has been already said), can be available to the
salvation of souls, unless the truth of the one and the
acceptableness of the other unto God be thoroughly believed by
those that so profess and practise. But penalties are no way
capable to produce such belief. It is only light and evidence
that can work a change in men's opinions; which light can in no
manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other outward
penalties.
These considerations, to omit many others that might have been
urged to the same purpose, seem unto me sufficient to conclude
that all the power of civil government relates only to men's
civil interests, is confined to the care of the things of this
world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come. Let us now
consider what a church is. A church, then, I take to be a
voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their
own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such
manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the
salvation of their souls.
No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect,
but everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which
he believes he has found that profession and worship which is
truly acceptable to God. The hope of salvation, as it was the
only cause of his entrance into that communion, so it can be the
only reason of his stay there. For if afterwards he discover
anything either erroneous in the doctrine or incongruous in the
worship of that society to which he has joined himself, why
should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to
enter?
But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would
only ask them here, by the way, if it be not more agreeable to
the Church of Christ to make the conditions of her communion
consist in such things, and such things only, as the Holy Spirit
has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be
necessary to salvation; I ask, I say, whether this be not more
agreeable to the Church of Christ than for men to impose their
own inventions and interpretations upon others as if they were
of Divine authority, and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as
absolutely necessary to the profession of Christianity, such
things as the Holy Scriptures do either not mention, or at least
not expressly command?
...that the Church of Christ should persecute others, and force
others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and doctrine, I
could never yet find in any of the books of the New
Testament.
But, it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical
laws be established, if they must be thus destitute of all
compulsive power? I answer: They must be established by means
suitable to the nature of such things, whereof the external
profession and observation - if not proceeding from a thorough
conviction and approbation of the mind - is altogether useless
and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this society
are to be kept within their duty are exhortations, admonitions,
and advices. If by these means the offenders will not be
reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing
further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons,
who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast
out and separated from the society. This is the last and utmost
force of ecclesiastical authority.
...in all such cases care is to be taken that the sentence of
excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with it no
rough usage of word or action whereby the ejected person may any
wise be damnified in body or estate. For all force (as has often
been said) belongs only to the magistrate, nor ought any private
persons at any time to use force, unless it be in self-defence
against unjust violence. Excommunication neither does, nor can,
deprive the excommunicated person of any of those civil goods
that he formerly possessed. All those things belong to the civil
government and are under the magistrate's protection.
...no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice
another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another
church or religion.
This is the fundamental and immutable right of a spontaneous
society - that it has power to remove any of its members who
transgress the rules of its institution; but it cannot, by the
accession of any new members, acquire any right of jurisdiction
over those that are not joined with it. And therefore peace,
equity, and friendship are always mutually to be observed by
particular churches, in the same manner as by private persons,
without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one
another.
...every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or
heretical. For whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be
true and the contrary unto those things it pronounce, to be
error. So that the controversy between these churches about the
truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on
both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at
Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can
be determined. The decision of that question belongs only to the
Supreme judge of all men, to whom also alone belongs the
punishment of the erroneous.
...if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting
churches were in the right, there would not accrue thereby unto
the orthodox any right of destroying the other. For churches
have neither any jurisdiction in worldly matters, nor are fire
and sword any proper instruments wherewith to convince men's
minds of error, and inform them of the truth.
...the only right method of propagating truth, which has no such
way of prevailing as when strong arguments and good reason are
joined with the softness of civility and good usage.
No peace and security, no, not so much as common friendship, can
ever be established or preserved amongst men so long as this
opinion prevails, that dominion is founded in grace and that
religion is to be propagated by force of arms.
It is not my business to inquire here into the original of the
power or dignity of the clergy. This only I say, that,
whencesoever their authority be sprung, since it is
ecclesiastical, it ought to be confined within the bounds of the
Church, nor can it in any manner be extended to civil affairs,
because the Church itself is a thing absolutely separate and
distinct from the commonwealth.
...how great would be the fruit, both in Church and State, if
the pulpits everywhere sounded with this doctrine of peace and
toleration...
In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in
the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what
suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes
best.
Let them not supply their want of reasons with the instruments
of force...
Let them not call in the magistrate's authority to the aid of
their eloquence or learning, lest perhaps, whilst they pretend
only love for the truth, this their intemperate zeal, breathing
nothing but fire and sword, betray their ambition and show that
what they desire is temporal dominion. For it will be very
difficult to persuade men of sense that he who with dry eyes and
satisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the executioner
to be burnt alive, does sincerely and heartily concern himself
to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to
come.
...the care of souls does not belong to the magistrate. Not a
magisterial care, I mean (if I may so call it), which consists
in prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments. But a
charitable care, which consists in teaching, admonishing, and
persuading, cannot be denied unto any man. The care, therefore,
of every man's soul belongs unto himself and is to be left unto
himself. But what if he neglect the care of his soul? I answer:
What if he neglect the care of his health or of his estate,
which things are nearlier related to the government of the
magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an
express law that such a one shall not become poor or sick? Laws
provide, as much as is possible, that the goods and health of
subjects be not injured by the fraud and violence of others;
they do not guard them from the negligence or ill-husbandry of
the possessors themselves. No man can be forced to be rich or
healthful whether he will or no.
The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better
known to the magistrate than to private persons, and therefore I
cannot safely take him for my guide, who may probably be as
ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is less
concerned for my salvation than I myself am.
But, after all, the principal consideration, and which
absolutely determines this controversy, is this: Although the
magistrate's opinion in religion be sound, and the way that he
appoints be truly Evangelical, yet, if I be not thoroughly
persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me
in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against
the dictates of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions
of the blessed. I may grow rich by an art that I take not
delight in; I may be cured of some disease by remedies that I
have not faith in; but I cannot be saved by a religion that I
distrust and by a worship that I abhor. It is in vain for an
unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man's
profession. Faith only and inward sincerity are the things that
procure acceptance with God. The most likely and most approved
remedy can have no effect upon the patient, if his stomach
reject it as soon as taken; and you will in vain cram a medicine
down a sick man's throat, which his particular constitution will
be sure to turn into poison. In a word, whatsoever may be
doubtful in religion, yet this at least is certain, that no
religion which I believe not to be true can be either true or
profitable unto me. In vain, therefore, do princes compel their
subjects to come into their Church communion, under pretence of
saving their souls. If they believe, they will come of their own
accord, if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail
them. How great soever, in fine, may be the pretence of
good-will and charity, and concern for the salvation of men's
souls, men cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no.
And therefore, when all is done, they must be left to their own
consciences.
Men, therefore, constituted in this liberty are to enter into
some religious society, that they meet together, not only for
mutual edification, but to own to the world that they worship
God and offer unto His Divine Majesty such service as they
themselves are not ashamed of and such as they think not
unworthy of Him, nor unacceptable to Him; and, finally, that by
the purity of doctrine, holiness of life, and decent form of
worship, they may draw others unto the love of the true
religion, and perform such other things in religion as cannot be
done by each private man apart. These religious societies I call
Churches; and these, I say, the magistrate ought to tolerate,
for the business of these assemblies of the people is nothing
but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care ofI
mean the salvation of their souls; nor in this case is there any
difference between the National Church and other separated
congregations.
As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws the use of
any rites and ceremonies in any Church, so neither has he any
power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are
already received, approved, and practised by any Church;
because, if he did so, he would destroy the Church itself: the
end of whose institution is only to worship God with freedom
after its ownmanner. You will say, by this rule, if some
congregations should have a mind to sacrifice infants, or (as
the primitive Christians were falsely accused) lustfully pollute
themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or practise any other
such heinous enormities, is the magistrate obliged to tolerate
them, because they are committed in a religious assembly? I
answer: No. These things are not lawful in the ordinary course
of life, nor in any private house; and therefore neither are
they so in the worship of God, or in any religious meeting. But,
indeed, if any people congregated upon account of religion
should be desirous to sacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought
to be prohibited by a law. Meliboeus, whose calf it is, may
lawfully kill his calf at home, and burn any part of it that he
thinks fit. For no injury is thereby done to any one, no
prejudice to another man's goods. And for the same reason he may
kill his calf also in a religious meeting. Whether the doing so
be well-pleasing to God or no, it is their part to consider that
do it. The part of the magistrate is only to take care that the
commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury
done to any man, either in life or estate. And thus what may be
spent on a feast may be spent on a sacrifice. But if
peradventure such were the state of things that the interest of
the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be
forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock
of cattle that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain,
who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all
his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever? Only it
is to be observed that, in this case, the law is not made about
a religious, but a political matter; nor is the sacrifice, but
the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited. By this we see
what difference there is between the Church and the
Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth cannot be
prohibited by the magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is
permitted unto any of his subjects for their ordinary use,
neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sect of
people for their religious uses.
But those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a
people in their ordinary use and are, therefore, forbidden by
laws, those things ought not to be permitted to Churches in
their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought always to be very
careful that he do not misuse his authority to the oppression of
any Church, under pretence of public good.
Not even Americans, subjected unto a Christian prince, are to be
punished either in body or goods for not embracing our faith and
worship. If they are persuaded that they please God in observing
the rites of their own country and that they shall obtain
happiness by that means, they are to be left unto God and
themselves.
For it does not belong unto the magistrate to make use of his
sword in punishing everything, indifferently, that he takes to
be a sin against God. Covetousness, uncharitableness, idleness,
and many other things are sins by the consent of men, which yet
no man ever said were to be punished by the magistrate. The
reason is because they are not prejudicial to other men's
rights, nor do they break the public peace of societies.
If a Roman Catholic believes that to be really the body of
Christ which another man calls bread, he does no injury thereby
to his neighbour. If a Jew does not believe the New Testament to
be the Word of God, he does not thereby alter anything in men's
civil rights. If a heathen doubt of both Testaments, he is not
therefore to be punished as a pernicious citizen. The power of
the magistrate and the estates of the people may be equally
secure whether any man believe these things or no. I readily
grant that these opinions are false and absurd. But the business
of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the
safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular
man's goods and person.
...that seeing one man does not violate the right of another by
his erroneous opinions and undue manner of worship, nor is his
perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs, therefore, the
care of each man's salvation belongs only to himself. But I
would not have this understood as if I meant hereby to condemn
all charitable admonitions and affectionate endeavours to reduce
men from errors, which are indeed the greatest duty of a
Christian. Any one may employ as many exhortations and arguments
as he pleases, towards the promoting of another man's salvation.
But all force and compulsion are to be forborne. Nothing is to
be done imperiously. Nobody is obliged in that matter to yield
obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another,
further than he himself is persuaded. Every man in that has the
supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself. And the
reason is because nobody else is concerned in it, nor can
receive any prejudice from his conduct therein. But besides
their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal
lives here upon earth; the state whereof being frail and
fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need of several
outward conveniences to the support thereof, which are to be
procured or preserved by pains and industry. For those things
that are necessary to the comfortable support of our lives are
not the spontaneous products of nature, nor do offer themselves
fit and prepared for our use. This part, therefore, draws on
another care and necessarily gives another employment. But the
pravity of mankind being such that they had rather injuriously
prey upon the fruits of other men's labours than take pains to
provide for themselves, the necessity of preserving men in the
possession of what honest industry has already acquired and also
of preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may
acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into
society with one another, that by mutual assistance and joint
force they may secure unto each other their properties, in the
things that contribute to the comfort and happiness of this
life, leaving in the meanwhile to every man the care of his own
eternal happiness, the attainment whereof can neither be
facilitated by another man's industry, nor can the loss of it
turn to another man's prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced
from him by any external violence. But, forasmuch as men thus
entering into societies, grounded upon their mutual compacts of
assistance for the defence of their temporal goods, may,
nevertheless, be deprived of them, either by the rapine and
fraud of their fellow citizens, or by the hostile violence of
foreigners, the remedy of this evil consists in arms, riches,
and multitude of citizens; the remedy of the other in laws; and
the care of all things relating both to one and the other is
committed by the society to the civil magistrate. This is the
original, this is the use, and these are the bounds of the
legislative (which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth.
I mean that provision may be made for the security of each man's
private possessions; for the peace, riches, and public
commodities of the whole people; and, as much as possible, for
the increase of their inward strength against foreign invasions.
These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to
what end the legislative power ought to be directed and by what
measures regulated; and that is the temporal good and outward
prosperity of the society; which is the sole reason of men's
entering into society, and the only thing they seek and aim at
in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in
reference to their eternal salvation, and that is that every one
should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be
acceptable to the Almighty, on whose good pleasure and
acceptance depends their eternal happiness. For obedience is
due, in the first place, to God and, afterwards to the
laws.
As for other practical opinions, though not absolutely free from
all error, if they do not tend to establish domination over
others, or civil impunity to the Church in which they are
taught, there can be no reason why they should not be
tolerated.
...liberty of conscience is every man's natural right...
...nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion either by
law or force.
Just and moderate governments are everywhere quiet, everywhere
safe; but oppression raises ferments and makes men struggle to
cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke. I know that seditions
are very frequently raised upon pretence of religion, but it is
as true that for religion subjects are frequently ill treated
and live miserably. Believe me, the stirs that are made proceed
not from any peculiar temper of this or that Church or religious
society, but from the common disposition of all mankind, who
when they groan under any heavy burthen endeavour naturally to
shake off the yoke that galls their necks. Suppose this business
of religion were let alone, and that there were some other
distinction made between men and men upon account of their
different complexions, shapes, and features, so that those who
have black hair (for example) or grey eyes should not enjoy the
same privileges as other citizens; that they should not be
permitted either to buy or sell, or live by their callings; that
parents should not have the government and education of their
own children; that all should either be excluded from the
benefit of the laws, or meet with partial judges; can it be
doubted but these persons, thus distinguished from others by the
colour of their hair and eyes, and united together by one common
persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate as any
others that had associated themselves merely upon the account of
religion?
...there is only one thing which gathers people into seditious
commotions, and that is oppression.
...if solemn assemblies, observations of festivals, public
worship be permitted to any one sort of professors, all these
things ought to be permitted to the Presbyterians, Independents,
Anabaptists, Arminians, Quakers, and others, with the same
liberty. Nay, if we may openly speak the truth, and as becomes
one man to another, neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought
to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because
of his religion. The Gospel commands no such thing. The Church
which "judgeth not those that are without"* wants it not. And
the commonwealth, which embraces indifferently all men that are
honest, peaceable, and industrious, requires it not. Shall we
suffer a Pagan to deal and trade with us, and shall we not
suffer him to pray unto and worship God? If we allow the Jews to
have private houses and dwellings amongst us, why should we not
allow them to have synagogues? Is their doctrine more false,
their worship more abominable, or is the civil peace more
endangered by their meeting in public than in their private
houses? But if these things may be granted to Jews and Pagans,
surely the condition of any Christians ought not to be worse
than theirs in a Christian commonwealth.
It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided),
but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different
opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced all
the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon
account of religion.
I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of
madness as that he dare give out his consequences and
interpretations of Scripture as divine inspirations and compare
the articles of faith that he has framed according to his own
fancy with the authority of Scripture.
...however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be
deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to impose it upon
others as a necessary article of faith because we believe it to
be agreeable to the rule of faith, unless we would be content
also that other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same
manner, and that we should be compelled to receive and profess
all the different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans,
Calvinists, Remonstrants, Anabaptists, and other sects which the
contrivers of symbols, systems, and confessions are accustomed
to deliver to their followers as genuine and necessary
deductions from the Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at the
extravagant arrogance of those men who think that they
themselves can explain things necessary to salvation more
clearly than the Holy Ghost, the eternal and infinite wisdom of
God.
...nothing in worship or discipline can be necessary to
Christian communion but what Christ our legislator, or the
Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in
express words.